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1. Introduction 
The increased exchange of goods, services, peoples and ideas across borders, intrinsic 
to globalisation, have had many and multi-faceted effects. Those affecting culture are 
amongst the most controversial. The ‘trade and culture’ quandary could indeed be 
phrased more revealingly as ‘trade versus culture’. It is an area of contestation that 
emerged in the forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its institutional 
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The debate 
became particularly heated during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
(1986−1994). The European Community (EC) and its member states played a key role 
in this battle, which almost turned into a stumbling block of the entire negotiations 
and ultimately had a strong impact on the design of the WTO Agreements, especially 
the rules on services.  
This chapter maps these developments and the positions of the European Union (EU 
or the Union) and its member states, which were not always coherent. It also looks at 
the actual results of the trade versus culture contestation – that is, the rules on trade in 
goods and services in the WTO and how they reflect the need for more policy space 
in matters of cultural policy, which the EU so ardently pressed for. The chapter 
further analyses the evolution of both the international trade regulation and the 
discourse on cultural policy. This discourse has in fact undergone a major 
transformation in the last two decades, as it has moved from the ‘exception culturelle’ 
rhetoric, which dominated the Uruguay trade talks, towards a more positive but also 
more pro-active agenda under the slogan of cultural diversity. The EU has been a 
major driver of this transformation, which has succeeded in mobilising the 
international community and ultimately led to the adoption of the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
The chapter concludes by appraisal of the current state of the debate situating it into 
the broader picture of contemporary global governance. It asks how the EU could 
effectively pursue its cultural policy aspirations and endorse its cultural diversity 
agenda in a world of complexity and rapid technological change, in particular in view 
of the affordances of digital media. 
2. A look at the origins of the cultural diversity discourse 
Although the idea of state protection of cultural identity is not exceptional and has 
existed for many years, possibly going as far back as the origins of sovereignty 
(Petito, 2001), the international policy debate on the relationship between trade and 
culture began only after World War I. This has to do with the changing nature of the 
medium, as well as with the particular period in history. In the former sense, although 
the printed media, such as books, newspapers and magazines, were the first 
manifestation of the industrialisation of cultural production, they had relatively low 
tradability, mostly due to their cultural specificity and the use of local language, 
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which made them less appealing to a critical mass of consumers outside the domestic 
market (Footer and Graber, 2000: 116–117). Audiovisual media, especially film, in 
contrast, proved more suitable for engaging and appealing to a broader audience. 
After World War I, the initial predominance of European cinema had subsided and 
Hollywood had clearly become the new centre of global film-making, exporting 
visual entertainment in vast amounts (Trumpbour, 2007; Bruner, 2008; Singh, 2008).  
As a reaction to this shift of power and fearing both the economic and cultural impact 
of Hollywood, many European governments introduced measures to protect their 
domestic film industries, mostly in the form of import and screen quotas. These 
measures found expression in the ‘Special Provisions Relating to Cinematograph 
Films’, which became part of the GATT 1947. Article IV thereof permitted quotas for 
‘the exhibition of cinematograph films of national origin during a specified minimum 
proportion of the total screen time’, while preserving the general ban on quantitative 
restrictions on imports (GATT Article XI). The screen quotas under Article IV GATT 
are a proof that cultural exceptions were indeed accepted by the GATT members. But 
they also reveal the relatively narrow focus of such exceptions on audiovisual media. 
The idea that some measures protecting national cultural industries may be justified 
was also reflected in bilateral and regional fora. In 1988, the cultural proponents 
celebrated a major victory when Canadian negotiators introduced a ‘cultural 
exclusion’ clause in the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA).1 Five years 
later, such exclusion was also included in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which incorporated by reference CUSFTA in Annex 2106.2 It should be 
noted, however, that this cultural clause was coupled with a retaliation provision that 
significantly limited by design its practical use. 
The cultural exception proponents were eager to transplant these localised ‘successes’ 
into the multilateral context. The tension between trade and culture had intensified at 
this point of time as technology, especially satellites, increasingly facilitated diffusion 
of cultural content, not only in film but also in television. Another important reason 
for the particular intensity of the cultural exception battle fought during the Uruguay 
Round had to do with the round’s special mandate and the significance of its 
outcomes. The Uruguay Round was not simply aimed at dismantling tariff barriers but 
was a much further reaching undertaking that ultimately led to the establishment of 
the WTO with a new structure and an impressively effective dispute settlement 
mechanism (Jackson, 1997). The WTO, which became operational on 1 January 1995, 
included domains previously unaffected by international trade regulation – most 
notably, intellectual property (by means of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS) and services (by means of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS).3 
                                                
1 Canada–US Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987–2 January 1988, 27 ILM 281 (1988). 
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 289 (1993). 
3 The law of the WTO is contained in several agreements, attached as annexes to the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO. The GATT, GATS and TRIPS are contained in Annex 1 of the 
WTO Agreement. Other Annexes concern additional aspects of liberalisation such as the dispute 
settlement procedure (Annex 2), the trade policy review mechanism (Annex 3) and certain plurilateral 
agreements (Annex 4). 
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The cultural proponents at the WTO, led by the European Communities4 and Canada, 
had an ambitious goal during the Uruguay Round of negotiations. They aimed at 
exempting any product or service that is culture-related from the rules of the 
negotiated WTO Agreements – and hence at establishing an ‘exception culturelle’. 
While they were eager to create such rules that would allow carve-outs for all cultural 
sectors, it should be again stressed that the main focus of the efforts was upon the 
exclusion of audiovisual services, as the sensitivities in the media sector were the 
highest and as other cultural services were less tradable. 
Reflecting this narrow focus of the tension, during the Uruguay trade talks, a Working 
Group on Audiovisual Services was established. Its essential task was to consider 
whether the special cultural considerations related to the audiovisual sector 5 
demanded its total exclusion from the scope of the services agreement, or whether a 
dedicated annex to the Agreement would provide a solution. The opinions differed 
profoundly, and even the diplomatic vernacular of trade representatives could not 
conceal the chasm between those in favour of free trade and those in favour of 
shielding (national) culture. While Canada and audiovisual media exporters, such as 
India, Brazil and Hong Kong were important actors (WTO, 1990a), it is worthwhile 
mentioning that the greatest clash on media matters was between the EC and the 
United States (Singh, 2008: 122 and passim). This particular feature of the discourse 
on trade and culture set it apart from other ‘trade and …’ debates, which typically 
involve confrontation between developed (where the US and the EU tend to share the 
common front) and developing countries (Lang, 2007). 
When discussing the role of the EC on the international scene, it should be noted that 
although the EC had limited powers in cultural affairs, as the core competence 
remained with the member states (Craufurd Smith, 2004, 2011), it had more leeway in 
the field of audiovisual services.6 The Television without Frontiers Directive (TWF), 
adopted in 1989, is an expression of this and proved the centrepiece of the evolving 
and expanding European media policy (Burri, 2007; Harrison and Woods, 2007). 
Noteworthy in the context of the present discussion is that despite being essentially a 
liberalisation instrument, the TWF contained two specific provisions (Articles 4 and 
5), which were the only tools at the Union level explicitly meant to serve cultural 
goals by ensuring a balance of offerings in the EU broadcasting markets. Article 4 
TWF called upon the member states to ensure, where practicable and by appropriate 
                                                
4 The three European Communities were the ‘European Economic Community’ (EEC), the ‘European 
Coal and Steel Community’ (ECSC), and the ‘European Atomic Energy Community’ (EAEC or 
Euratom). It was the ‘European Communities’ and not the European Community or the European 
Union, which signed the WTO Agreements. This was due to some questions regarding the competence 
of the European Community in external affairs, which were subsequently clarified (Council Decision 
94/800/EC of 22 December 1994, concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as 
regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral 
negotiations (1986–1994), OJ L 336, 23/12/1994, p. 191). As of 1 December 2009, which signals the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the name used in the WTO is the European Union (EU). 
5 Pursuant to the technical classification scheme, which WTO members applied during the negotiations 
and in tailoring their concessions, the audiovisual services sector was specifically defined. It included 
the following sub-sectors: motion picture and video tape production and distribution services; motion 
picture projection services; radio and television services; radio and television transmission services; 
sound recording and others (WTO, 1991). 
6 Following the principle of subsidiarity, the EC is to encourage cooperation between the Member 
States but, if necessary, supplement their action in certain fields, notably in ‘artistic and literary 
creation, including in the audiovisual sector’ (Article 151(2) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (EC Treaty), now 167(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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means, that broadcasters allocate a majority of time on TV channels, to European-
made programmes (the so-called ‘European works’). Article 5 TWF was intended to 
secure that a minimum proportion of viewing time (10 percent) is reserved to 
European works created by independent producers, or alternatively that a minimum 
programme budget is allocated to independent productions.  
The EC was undoubtedly keen to preserve these quotas (Burri, 2007; Attentional et 
al., 2011) and thus to make them permissible at the international level (Burri, 2009). 
Generally, the EC sought to secure sufficient wiggle room for cultural policy 
measures to be taken at both the EC and at the member state levels (very often under 
the influence of key players in the debate, such as notably, France). 
The EU pursued these goals by relying on a set of arguments relating to the specific 
qualities of cultural goods and services. This underlying strategy has been typical of 
the EU’s positioning in global governance debates bearing on culture and became 
truly fully-fledged after the end of the cultural exception battle and in its conceptual 
and institutional transformation into a cultural diversity policy (Burri, 2010a). At its 
very basis, such a policy is built around the two-pronged axiom that some sort of 
additional regulation is indispensable in markets for cultural goods and services 
because they fail, and that the ensuing market failures can be corrected through state 
intervention.7 These economic rationales have been strengthened in the political 
context by an enduring negative attitude towards globalisation and its effects, 
including or even especially those upon culture (Held et al., 1999; Cowen, 2002; 
Giddens, 2002). More concretely, in the WTO setting, the cultural identity line has 
been prominent in the tactics of the EU – on the one hand, by emphasising the 
importance of the audiovisual industry to European identity and unity, and by 
highlighting the harmful effects of the American entertainment industry, on the other 
(Singh, 2008: 132–133). 
The EC sought to ensure that in liberalising audiovisual services, their cultural 
specificities would be respected, by means of an annex (WTO, 1990a). Audiovisual 
services, defined fairly broadly, were to be exempted to a significant extent from the 
obligations of most-favoured-nation (MFN), national treatment and market access 
(WTO, 1990a) – that is, from the core non-discrimination duties and progressive 
liberalisation rationale, which underlie the entire multilateral trade system.  
It is fair to say that the EC was not completely united in this approach and there were 
various opinions within it. France has been very pro-active and a leading player. 
Germany and Britain were somewhat reluctant (Singh, 2008: 122–123). The 
European Commission, headed at the time by Jacques Delors, acted as a strong policy 
entrepreneur, reflecting as well as shaping the views of the member states (Ross, 
1995: 115; Levy, 1999; Singh, 2008: 127). The framing of the audiovisual services 
matter as giving a particular behavioural profile for the EU on the international scene 
has had a positive feedback effect and boosted European cultural identity (Goff, 2000, 
2007; Singh, 2008: 133–134). It is also to be acknowledged that the institutional 
design of the EU has had a clear impact on international trade negotiations designed 
to change the European policy status quo – Meunier argues that in such ‘conservative’ 
cases, unanimity voting and restricted delegation make the EU a tough bargainer, so 
                                                
7 Failures typical of markets for cultural goods and services are: a) failures due to economies of scale in 
production and distribution; b) failures due to the nature of competition in products with substantial 
public goods aspects; c) failures due to the impact of externalities on the pricing of cultural products; 
and d) failures due to collective action problems (Sauvé and Steinfatt, 2000; Baker, 2001). 
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that the negotiating opponent cannot obtain more than what the most conservative EU 
state is willing to concede (Meunier, 2000), which in the present case is clearly 
France.  
The US, heavily lobbied by the entertainment industry (Grant and Wood, 2004: 352–
376; Singh, 2008: 134–138), matched the European offensive. The US was opposed 
to any cultural exception, regardless of whether the exception was part of the overall 
framework agreement or confined to audiovisual services. Its strongest argument was 
that of disguised protectionism, especially considering the intrinsic difficulty of 
defining ‘national’ and ‘culture’. It also stressed consumers’ freedom of choice, as 
well as other positive effects of free trade in cultural products (WTO, 1990b). Being 
cautious about pushing too far on the cultural identity issue, the US had been 
consistent in framing the whole debate as one on trade not culture (Singh, 2008: 134–
135).  
It merits to be noted that due to the extreme political charge of the trade and culture 
debate, the audiovisual services quandary almost turned into a stumbling block for the 
entire multilateral trade agenda (Graber, 2004), which had been designed as a ‘single 
undertaking’ and accordingly demanded agreement by all on all issues. One must at 
the same time also bear in mind that the audiovisual sector was only one deal amongst 
many and there were trade-offs and other interests within the WTO bargaining 
process and outside it (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Singh, 2008). So, it would be 
wrong to isolate this contestation of trade and culture, as it should be seen in the 
context of both grander international cooperation deals, as well as of specific 
domestic circumstances and their historical evolution, such as for instance those 
related to the perceived role of France in culture (Meunier, 2001, 2006). 
3. The law of the WTO and the agreement to disagree 
The EU with its strongly endorsed cultural exception agenda was only partly 
successful at the end of the day. On paper, the text of the WTO Agreements includes 
no cultural exception of any kind. Such a reading does not, however, reveal the 
practical reality of liberalised services markets and of the policy options available. 
Shortly before the adoption of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, the 
EC and the US agreed to disagree on addressing cultural matters without striking any 
concrete deal.8 This would have long-term implications for both the law of the WTO 
and for future endeavours to shape cultural toolkits at all levels of governance – be it 
national, regional or global. 
The gist of the Uruguay Round results in the field of services is that while no services 
sector is excluded from the GATS,9 there are a number of flexibilities built in. They 
allow in effect the lesser opening up of certain sectors, which are sensitive to 
domestic constituencies (Galt, 2004). Compared to the GATT, which regulates trade 
                                                
8 As legend would have it, early in the morning of 14 December 1994, just before the US President’s 
Fast Track Authority was to expire, Leon Brittan, as EU representative, offered the US Trade 
Representative (USTR) Mickey Kantor a deal to bind the television quota at 49 percent as part of an 
audiovisual services agreement and to continue negotiations on box office receipt taxes in France, as 
well as on blank video and audio tapes taxes. After discussions with President Clinton and Hollywood 
representatives, the US turned the deal down. Instead of signing something which the lobbies at home 
would have opposed, the USTR walked away and the Europeans made the infamous MFN exemption 
from the GATS (Preeg, 1995: 172; Singh, 2008: 135–136). 
9 Except for services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority according to Article I:3(b) 
GATS. For a detailed interpretation, see Krajewski (2003). 
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in goods, the GATS offers substantially more wiggle room for national policy-makers 
and is less aggressive in terms of opening markets. While under the GATT, 
obligations regarding national treatment and quantitative restrictions apply across the 
board, the GATS framework adopted a ‘bottom-up’ (or ‘positive list’) approach. 
Thereby, WTO members can choose the services sectors and sub-sectors in which 
they are willing to make market access (Article XVI GATS) or national treatment 
(Article XVII GATS) commitments, and can define the modalities of these 
commitments. Even the MFN obligation – that is, the duty to treat equally all like 
foreign services and services suppliers, which is fundamental to the entire trade 
system, can be subject to limitation under the GATS (Article II:2).  
As a result of this malleability in design and in spite of the considerable economic 
gains to be reaped from the liberalisation of audiovisual media services (Roy, 2005: 
941; Singh, 2007), almost all members, with the notable exception of the US, Japan 
and New Zealand, have been reluctant to commit and have listed significant MFN 
exemptions (Roy, 2005; WTO, 2010; Shi, 2013). Indeed, audiovisual media is the 
least liberalised services sector. The EU and its member states have made no 
commitments (WTO, 1997) and tabled a number of MFN exemptions, relating mostly 
to extension of national treatment to audiovisual works covered by co-production 
agreements and support schemes, such as the MEDIA programme10 (WTO, 1994). 
What is particularly interesting when looking at the members’ commitments for 
audiovisual services, and most illustratively those of the EU, is that they reflect a 
resolute ‘all-or-nothing’ approach. The substantial scheduling flexibility permitting a 
wide variety of commitments ranging between full liberalisation and absolute non-
commitment is not made use of. This is somewhat strange because for sub-sectors 
where government regulations and trade restrictions are not common, such as sound 
recording, there is still a ridiculously low level of commitment. In a more systemic 
sense, this is odd because the very goals of an international trade agreement are 
compromised as the absence of commitment in a given sector equals absolute 
freedom to take any action at a later point of time. ‘This absence of any guarantee of 
openness stands in stark contrast to the economic and trade importance of the 
[audiovisual] sector (and in particular its intensive use of technology and creativity) 
as well as the importance of the predictability and stability given by commitments − 
that is, the certainty that certain restrictions won’t be maintained or introduced in the 
future’ (Roy, 2005: 940–941).  
The special status of audiovisual services for the EU is discernible again in the fact 
that for other culture-related services, such as ‘printing and publishing’, or ‘news, 
press and agency services’, the EU has made almost full commitments for national 
treatment and market access, only with some foreign ownership exceptions. Even for 
entertainment services, such as theatre, circus and live bands, the commitments are 
more nuanced and not following the ‘all-or-nothing’ pattern (WTO, 1997). 
                                                
10 The MEDIA programme has been an important EU tool for supporting the development and 
distribution of European films, as well as for training activities, festivals and promotion projects in the 
field of media. There have been four MEDIA programmes: MEDIA I (1990–1995); MEDIA II (1996–
2000), MEDIA plus (2001–2006) and MEDIA 2007 (2007–2013). As of 2014, the newly launched 
‘Creative Europe’ programme (2014–2020) replaces the MEDIA, MEDIA Mundus and Culture 
programmes. Within it, there is a MEDIA sub-programme, which supports the EU film and audiovisual 
industries financially in the development, distribution and promotion of their work. 
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Despite this state of affairs, which permits almost unlimited possibilities for measures 
protecting domestic cultural industries and/or discriminating against foreign products 
and services, in political terms, the scope for domestic measures regarding trade in 
culture has not been found sufficient. The Uruguay Round’s ‘Agreement to Disagree’ 
offered no real solution for the cultural proponents. The arguments put forward in 
support of this case were several: The further liberalisation commitment incorporated 
in the GATS (Article XIX) was impending and the MFN exemptions made were at 
least theoretically limited in time.11 In addition, the general exceptions available under 
Articles XX GATT and XIV GATS, which could justify measures otherwise violating 
the WTO norms in the respective products and services trade domains, were deemed 
insufficient to provide appropriate consideration of the pursuit of cultural objectives. 
Article XX(f) GATT was the notable exception because it was designed to exempt 
measures for the protection of ‘national treasures of historic, artistic, or archaeological 
value’. The scope of the provision was, however, thought too limited and of little use 
when contemporary creative production, such as films or television programmes, was 
at stake. Furthermore, the norm had no counterpart under the GATS and could not 
help when services were affected. A particularly hard blow to the cultural exception 
backers had been the Canada–Periodicals case,12 which signalled the unwillingness 
of the WTO adjudicative bodies to engage in balancing trade versus culture values: as 
the case was decided by the panel and the Appellate Body to the benefit of the US, 
and despite CUSFTA’s cultural exception clause. 
4. Doha round developments 
One could say that the post-Uruguay status quo very much resembles a de facto 
cultural exception. This exception is not however cast in law and is under the constant 
pressure of further liberalisation. The inherent insecurity has prompted the cultural 
exception proponents to look for solutions outside the WTO and resulted in the 
change of venue to the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO). It is noteworthy that the transition occurred under the more positive but 
also more ambitious agenda of cultural diversity, which was developed primarily 
under the International Network for Cultural Policy (INCP) and shaped by a small 
core of members, comprising Canada, Croatia, France, Greece, Mexico, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland (Burri, 2010a). 
This regime-shifting, which resulted in the successful adoption of the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
(Convention on Cultural Diversity or the Convention), is well documented and aptly 
discussed elsewhere in this volume. It suffices to say here that the EU has played a 
particularly prominent role in both the shaping of the concept of cultural diversity and 
in the developments leading towards the adoption of an international legally binding 
instrument, which seeks to protect national sovereignty in matters of culture (Acheson 
and Maule, 2004; Burri, 2010a). 
As for the WTO, it is evident that although the intensity of the trade versus culture 
clash seems to have subsided, few changes can be expected. The Doha Development 
                                                
11 The GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions states that, ‘[i]n principle, such [MFN] exemptions 
should not exceed a period of 10 years. In any event, they shall be subject to negotiation in subsequent 
trade liberalizing rounds’. The exemptions made should have thus expired in 2005. 
12 WTO Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada–Periodicals), 
WT/DS31/R, adopted 14 March 1997; WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals (Canada–Periodicals), WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 June 1997. 
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Agenda (DDA), launched in 2001 (WTO, 2001), as the next round of trade 
negotiations, originally intended to be completed by 2005, is a proof of this. Although 
the DDA is not stalling because of audiovisual media services, the present state of 
requests and offers for the sector reveals precious few new commitments. It is also 
notable that despite the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity and the 
associated mobilisation of the international community, we have not seen the 
formation of a negotiation bloc, which may seriously advance the cultural concerns 
within the WTO and seek their accommodation. Even the EU has not been 
particularly pro-active. It is simply pursuing its non-committal approach (WTO, 
2005a), so that it remains free to keep the present and adopt future measures in the 
field of media services. This is despite requests by other WTO members, such as 
Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico and the United States, to address the status quo by either 
full commitments in market access and national treatment, or by more targeted 
actions, such as binding of the current level of market opening or commitments under 
specific sub-headings (commonly, film production, distribution and projection 
services, and sometimes sound recording) (WTO, 2005b; 2010).  
Despite the recognition widely shared by key WTO members that the audiovisual 
sector has changed dramatically (Graber, 2004: 166–170; Roy, 2005: 931–936; WTO, 
2010), in particular in the face of the convergence of information technology, 
telecommunications and media services, companies and sectors, and of the sweeping 
transformations caused by the Internet, there has been little agreement on the way 
forward. The trade versus culture debate has had multiple effects outside the domain 
of audiovisual services, as initially narrowly construed. This is particularly evident in 
the discussions on advancing liberalisation and coherent global regulation in the 
‘neighbouring’ areas of telecommunications and electronic commerce (Burri, 2009), 
which mirror the legacy line of separation between the EU and the US. 
In line with its strategy, the EU argues that ‘[e]lectronic deliveries consist of supplies 
of services which fall within the scope of the GATS’ (WTO, 2000), and seeks to 
ensure that all digital media fall within the category of audiovisual services (WTO, 
2006), thus retaining its flexibility for MFN exemptions and limited commitments. 
This position of the EU has been adopted in the context of its overall global trade and 
culture agenda (European Commission, 2007), as well as in relation to the 
modernisation of the TWF (now called Audiovisual Media Services Directive, 
AVMS13) to include on-demand media services too, and to prescribe soft cultural 
quotas for them (Burri, 2007).  
The US takes the opposite position and has sought the deepest mode of liberalisation 
available – i.e. that of the GATT, coupled with the Information Technology 
Agreement14 (WTO, 1999). The opposing agendas of the EU and the US allow no 
straightforward solution – an unfortunate situation, which has been exacerbated by the 
insufficient ability of the WTO law to adapt to rapid technological changes due to the 
                                                
13 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010, on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), 
OJ L 95, 15/4/2010, p. 1. 
14 The Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA) was concluded in 
Singapore in December 1996. The ITA is a plurilateral agreement that operates on a MFN basis and 
seeks the abolition of tariffs for certain information technology products covered by the Agreement. 
The ITA has been fairly successful and covers some 97 per cent of global trade in these products. It is 
presently committed to by 76 WTO members (Lee-Makiyama, 2011). 
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intrinsic characteristic of the WTO as a ‘member-driven’ organisation (Davey and 
Jackson, 2008) and, specifically in the field of services, is due to the underlying and 
now largely outmoded services classification scheme (Weber and Burri, 2012; Tuthill 
and Roy, 2012). For instance, as the law presently stands, online games as a new type 
of cultural content platform, could be fitted into the discrete categories of computer 
and related services, value-added telecommunications services, entertainment or 
audiovisual services (Wunsch-Vincent, 2006: 71), each of which implies a completely 
different set of duties and flexibilities. The electronic commerce instance is 
illustrative of the negative spill-overs of the cultural debate, which prevent any 
practical solution in the short- to mid-term and leave the vital economic field of 
digital trade function under the conditions of substantial uncertainty. As Internet 
regulation matures, there is even a wave of new-generation barriers to digital trade 
(including localisation requirements and/or undue privacy, intellectual property and 
security requirements), which the WTO is unable to address, and its overall role in 
global digital trade governance may be so diminished (Burri, 2013a). 
The lack of a solution within the multilateral context of the WTO has also prompted 
members to take other, bilateral or regional, paths to advance their policy priorities 
(Wunsch-Vincent and Hold, 2012), typically through Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs). These are however most often the result of asymmetrical power bargains – 
developing countries may be seriously disadvantaged when striking those deals, 
adopting US–centric models or unwillingly reducing future regulatory space in key 
areas. Overall, there is increased fragmentation of rules and complexity in 
governance, which may render the protection of global public goods, including 
cultural diversity, more difficult (Maskus and Reichman, 2005). 
There have been a number of proposals in the literature to solve the ‘culture versus 
trade’ conundrum and make it more like ‘culture and trade’ (Burri, 2009: 45–54). One 
important cluster of suggestions attempts to find the appropriate linkage between the 
law of the WTO and the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, seeking mutual 
supportiveness between the two regimes and the attainment of some legal certainty 
through the ‘harder’ adjudicative mechanisms of the WTO (e.g. Graber, 2006). 
Another key group suggests ‘renovation’ of some WTO rules, whether culture-
specific or not, to make the law of the WTO more suitable for the simultaneous 
advancement of trade liberalisation and of public interest goals of importance to 
members and the international community (e.g. Voon, 2007a; 2007b). Next to the 
various points of critique one could formulate with regard to these proposals (Voon, 
2007b; Burri, 2009), a common feature is that none of them appears readily doable – 
to a large extent due to the strong path dependence in the trade and culture debate, 
which almost resembles a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Roy, 2005). The WTO jurisprudence 
as proven by the China – Publications and Audiovisual Products case15 has so far 
rejected the interface between the UNESCO Convention and the WTO Agreements 
(Burri, 2010b; Shi, 2013). 
The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity has in many senses only perpetuated 
this dialogue, as states, parties to the Convention, seek to counteract the liberalisation 
                                                
15 WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services 
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products), WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 21 December 2009. The EU acted as a third party to 
(submissions available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=407&code=3#_eu-
submissions). 
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efforts under the auspices of the WTO. Yet, despite many of the flaws of the 
UNESCO Convention (Burri, 2009), its role should not be understated. The UNESCO 
Convention is an important instrument, not so much because of its potential to 
effectively counterbalance trade rules but because it has forcefully promoted the 
concept of cultural diversity – as an overarching policy goal to be taken into account 
domestically and at the international scene. Although the implementation efforts are 
advancing only at slow pace so far (Burri, 2013b), there may be some space for legal 
innovation down the road. The EU may be a key player in this process, as the 
Protocols on Cultural Cooperation negotiated by the European Commission on behalf 
of the EU and its Member States in the context of the new generation of EU free trade 
agreements show (Loisen and De Ville, 2011). The protocols are on the one hand a 
direct implementation effort of the UNESCO Convention but also responses to the 
broader changes in the EU’s external policies. These changes relate to the extended 
competences of the Union in matters of common commercial policy after the Lisbon 
Treaty,16 as well as more specifically to the EU’s repositioning with regard to new 
regional or bilateral agreements having an economic integration dimension (European 
Commission, 2006). The latter foresees notably that audiovisual services (including 
the content-related implications of electronic commerce) should be excluded from the 
scope of such trade agreements, and that audiovisual and other cultural services 
should receive special treatment under dedicated cooperation frameworks (European 
Commission, 2012: 24).  
5. Concluding remarks 
The trade versus culture debate has been triggered by advancing globalisation and the 
increasing difficulty of reconciling economic and non-economic objectives, national 
sovereignty and global responsibilities. The discussions have been heavily politicised 
and reached their pinnacle in the Uruguay Round of negotiations, which marked the 
highest degree of institutionalisation of economic globalisation at the international 
level with the establishment of the WTO. The cultural exception strategy, which has 
been actively endorsed by the EU, only partly achieved its goals: although the law of 
the WTO does not contain any exception for cultural goods and services, it permits 
flexibilities in particular in the field of services, which allow WTO Members to shield 
some sensitive sectors from liberalisation. The EU and its member states, amongst 
other cultural proponents, have used this opportunity to the fullest, specifically in the 
audiovisual services sector. As noted earlier, media services is the sector with the 
lowest level of commitments.  
Little has changed since the conclusion of the Uruguay talks in 1994, which is odd, as 
we are now faced with a completely transformed media landscape. This may have led, 
amongst other things, to inadequacy of the existent policy measures aimed at 
achieving (national) cultural objectives, to negative spill-overs to other policy 
domains and to an overall incoherence in governance (Burri, 2009). Unfortunately 
very few of these problems have been appropriately addressed in the ongoing Doha 
                                                
16 Pursuant to Article 207 of the TFEU, EU trade policy is an exclusive EU competence for all sectors, 
without any sectorial carve-outs, shared competences or mixed agreements. Pre-Lisbon, there had been 
a carve-out for cultural and audiovisual services (Article 133(6) of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Union). Any agreement, which included provisions regarding cultural and audiovisual 
services, would so fall within the shared competence of the EU and the Member States and such mixed 
agreements had to be concluded together by the EU and the Member States (see e.g. Krajewski, 2005: 
95–97). 
 11 
Round of negotiations, and it is unlikely that they will be resolved even under the 
highly optimistic scenario of a successful close of the Doha Round, as the cultural 
exception legacy endures.  
Much has happened however outside the WTO. The underlying rhetoric of the trade 
and culture debate has been utterly transformed from ‘cultural exception’ to ‘cultural 
diversity’. It has also found a new institutional home with the UNESCO and 
ultimately led to the adoption of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2005. The Convention affirms 
state sovereignty in cultural matters and enjoys the broad support of the international 
community.  
The existing international legal framework places few limitations to the EU and its 
member states on their cultural policy programmes for the media. Change is not to be 
expected soon. In this respect, it should be clearly acknowledged that ‘cultural 
exception’ policies – that is, the willingness to draw a line between economic and 
cultural objectives and exempt cultural goods and services from trade regulation– are 
still well supported. A recent reminder of this path dependent discourse has been a 
decision of the EU Parliament with regard to the launch of the negotiations of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement between the EU 
and the US. While the European Parliament did give green light to the TTIP, it 
expressly asked, under considerable influence by France, that cultural and audiovisual 
services, including online services, should be excluded from the negotiating mandate 
in order to safeguard the ‘cultural exception’ and protect the cultural and linguistic 
diversity of the EU countries (European Parliament, 2013: paras. 11–12). The 
campaign outside the EU institutions was even louder. It included for instance a well-
publicized petition signed by some 5,000 directors, writers, technicians, producers, 
distributors and exhibitors across Europe and featured high profile names like Wim 
Wenders, Michael Haneke, Mike Leigh, Stephen Frears and Pedro Almodovar.  
The EU Parliament’s resolution is however non-binding and while audiovisual 
services are presently not part of the negotiating mandate (Council of the European 
Union, 2013), Commissioner De Gucht stressed that there is a clear possibility for the 
Commission to ‘come back to the Council with additional negotiating directives after 
on the basis of a discussion with our US counterparts’ (European Commission, 
2013a). Despite this possibility, the debate itself is indicative of the strong political 
forces in the EU in favour of preserving the status quo of cultural exception and 
indeed, expanding it to online services, as well as of the great difficulty to reconcile 
cultural and commercial interests, even between two industrialised partners and 
despite the general enthusiasm towards the impending bilateral trade deal (Kanter, 
2013). 
In light of this path dependency and the high levels of support amongst politicians, the 
creative industries and the general public in the EU, one may wonder why and how 
policies targeted at the protection and promotion of cultural diversity could change at 
all. The trigger for change may lie in the new media environment. We have argued 
elsewhere that the digital space, while not a panacea, offers unprecedented 
opportunities to cater for a vibrant and diverse cultural environment. We suggest that 
three paths for policy experimentation are particularly worthwhile considering in this 
regard: a) responding to the creative user; b) responding to the unlimited ‘shelf-space’ 
in cyberspace; and c) taking into account policies conventionally thought peripheral to 
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achieving cultural objectives and often falling outside the traditional media law and 
policy domain, as conceived pre-digitization and pre-convergence (Burri, 2012a). 
The EU has already launched some projects, such as Europeana: the European Digital 
Library, which reflect the changes brought about by the Internet, as well as use its 
affordances to attain important policy objectives – such as in this case, multilingual 
access to Europe’s distributed cultural heritage.17 There is in addition a growing 
awareness amongst the EU institutions that policies need to be adapted too. The 
Green Paper on Preparing for a Fully Converged Audiovisual World: Growth, 
Creation and Values (European Commission, 2013b) is a good basis to start such a 
‘renovation’ project, although it remains to be seen how this project will be carried on 
and in general, how the EU would implement its goal to ‘mainstream’ culture and 
make cultural diversity a valid policy objective in domains beyond audiovisual media 
(European Commission, 2007). It remains also to be seen whether the EU-wide policy 
transformations would lead to any changes in the EU’s stance at the WTO, or whether 
the preservation of the policy space will continue to be the preferred option. The TTIP 
and the US pressure may potentially trigger some rethinking. 
In implementing its cultural diversity policies, the EU (or any other global player) 
would need to consider not only the practical reality of contemporary media but also 
the changes in global governance. These are characterised by ailing multilateralism, 
intensified forum-shopping, proliferating PTAs, repositioning of traditional world 
powers and the emergence of new and stronger actors, to name but a few trends 
(Jackson, 2007; Cottier and Delimatsis, 2011; WTO, 2011). The emergent modes of 
cyber-governance, characterised by unilateral state action with global reach, 
regulation through intermediaries and through technology, only compound the 
existing complexity (Benkler, 2006; Lessig, 1999, 2006; Burri, 2012b). Against this 
backdrop, any future solution to the trade and culture quandary appears unlikely in the 
forum of the WTO or in the UNESCO alone, and would have to match the reality of 
multi-level, multi-domain governance in the attempt to reconcile economic and non-
economic objectives. 
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